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Abstract 
This article compares the explanatory power of five mainstream theories from international 
relations, political science and public management in understanding why, when they are engaged 
in deepening conflict and tension and even preparations for wars, states might simultaneously 
sustain deepening cooperation in global regulatory bodies. Analysis of explanatory power focuses 
on trade-offs among five key methodological virtues, and on buffering as an indicator of state 
unitariness. The theories are examined against the crucial case of one state’s commitment to the 
first international regulatory regime, the International Telegraph Union and the Submarine Cable 
Convention of 1884, from the founding of the ITU in 1865 to the outbreak of the Great War. In 
this article, we use UK National Archives files to reconstruct Britain’s decisions in telegraphy 
policy as our case of a state’s decision-making. We focus on four key clusters of decisions, spanning 
three sub-periods. The study finds each of the theories can descriptively capture some 
developments in some sub-periods, but not for the reasons identified in the theory and without 
generality of application. It therefore provides the basis for future theoretical development work 




In periods of international great tension, erosion of great power commitment to multilateral 
regimes is commonly observed: in the 1930s withdrawals from the League of Nations and many 
European regimes such as the international river bodies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020) accompanied 
protectionism and splintering of world trade. The US first began stymying the WTO’s appellate 
body in 2011. The Trump administration only withdrew its threat to leave the Universal Postal 
Union when other members agreed to allow it effectively to set tariffs unilaterally. Increasingly 
China builds regional alternatives to bypass the Bretton Woods institutions. It is straightforward 
to appreciate why great powers find multilateral bodies frustrating, and to recognise that they can 
find alternative unilateral solutions outside, or be content with regimes which they have blocked 
from functioning. What is puzzling is why many remain and even deepen their cooperation 
through these regimes with other states with which they may have serious tensions. 
 Why, therefore, would states sustain commitment to international regulatory bodies which can 
constrain their discretion? During periods of deepening international tension and conflict, wars, 
rumours of impending wars and movements toward protectionism, one would expect that 
international organisations would experience refusals to join, withdrawals by existing members, 
stymied programmes, withering or even closure. States always have reasons both for leaving and 
for remaining committed to international regulatory cooperation. Simultaneous commitment by 
states to cooperation and conflict is not uncommon, but it remains puzzling where (a) it is 
sustained over decades when both commitment and conflict are increasing simultaneously (b) states 
have feasible alternatives, if they withdraw, (c) no specific concessions are offered to states 
contemplating withdrawal to induce continued commitment and (d) the supposedly ‘technical’ 
character of regimes’ work cannot explain commitment, because that work is shot through with 
geopolitical and security considerations. 
 Yet without understanding why, when and exactly how reasons for commitment may outweigh 
reasons for leaving, especially in fields where regulatory cooperation has security implications, we 
lack understanding of causality in international affairs. The puzzle addressed here is not how and 
why international regimes persist resiliently, but, as Levy et al. (1995) called for work on, why states’ 
commitment to them might be so resilient, especially as conflict rises and when states have other 
options. Commitment by enough states – even if some withdraw – is a necessary condition for 
regime resilience. For some global regimes, great power membership is important, though total 
collapse need not follow their withdrawal. But it is not sufficient: resilience of regimes depends on 
more than the sum of the resilience of the commitments of a critical mass of member states. 
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 Recent research demonstrates that international cooperation is often difficult even where 
frameworks of cooperation are deeply institutionalised and when that cooperation is in key states’ 
interests – for example, because of domestic pressures on governments’ decisions (Hooghe et al, 
2020). Realists have long argued that states use international organisations to advance their own 
interests (Stone 2011), which can obstruct institutionalisation of states’ commitment. 
 This first article from a larger project aims to establish that despite decades of studies, a major 
gap in our understanding of this puzzle remains because even the most relevant theories struggle 
to explain state commitment in a ‘crucial’ case (one so central to the puzzle that any plausible 
theory should be expected to provide a reasonably powerful explanation for it). Because research 
advances comparing multiple theories’ explanatory power, this article considers evidence for and 
against five key, rival, well-known and widely used explanations offered by international relations, 
political science and public management research, for states continuing and deepening cooperation 
through global regulatory bodies when states are engaged in tension. Our crucial case is one major 
power’s commitment to a pivotal regime over fifty years of deepening great power tensions.  
 The next section introduces the five theories examined – namely, neoclassical realism, the 
integrative bargaining variant of liberal institutionalism, ideational theory, regulatory capture theory 
and bureaucratic politics. The following section explains why our case – Britain’s commitment to 
the International Telegraph Union and Submarine Cable Convention – is a crucial one and justifies 
its selection. Britain is chosen not for any intrinsic empirical interest or inherent importance as a 
case but because it presents the general puzzle in its clearest and most demanding form, and 
because of its analogous relevance for understanding great power relations contemporary 
international regimes. 
 The paper then presents an exploratory evaluation of how these five theories fare in accounting 
for four key clusters of decisions. (Strictly, we examine the question as a foreign policy puzzle, 
using international relations theories reformulated as theories of foreign policy-making, rather than 
as theories of international structure.) A key contribution is to introduce the concept of buffering 
and to use it to operationalise hypotheses derived from these theories for understanding how, 
organisationally and in internal political and administrative processes of policy making, 
commitment would be expected to be sustained by each theory of why states might commit: for if 
the theory’s account of how commitment is sustained is weak, then the account of why it might 
be sustained from which it is derived is likely also to be weak. 
 Continued use of multiple traditions in international relations shows that we cannot expect any 
one theory to explain all aspects of any case. Yet can fairly expect them to show reasonable trade-
offs among the basic methodological virtues by which explanatory power can be measured, but 
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which cannot be optimised simultaneously (Przeworski and Teune 1970; 6 and Bellamy 2012). 
Theories’ explanatory powers are rarely compared on their performance on those virtues and 
trade-offs, to structure a multi-criteria assessment: a key contribution of this article is to present 
an assessment in this form. The final section argues that, whilst each theory can capture aspects of 
particular governments’ decisions in particular sub-periods, none fares well in explaining a major 
power’s decision-making over several decades, nor are decisions predicted by the theories always 
driven by the reasons identified by the theories. 
 This article’s contribution therefore is partly a critical and deck-clearing one, showing that a 
crucial case of a major power’s resilient commitment is yet to be fully explained. Thus, the article 
presents a challenge to mainstream theories of foreign policymaking toward international 
regulatory cooperation. Secondly, we demonstrate the value of organisational theoretic concepts 
of buffering in assessing state unitariness for purposes of comparing theories. Third, the article 
also makes a significant methodological argument about how trade-offs among methodological 
virtues inform comparative theory assessment. In future articles, we shall develop a positive 
alternative explanation.  
 
Exploring theories of international regulatory governance 
International relations, political science and public management literatures have developed rival 
explanations for the institutionalisation of states’ commitment to global regulatory agencies (for 
IR theories, see Hasenclever et al. 1997). These explanations cluster roughly around the core 
traditions of realism, liberal institutionalism, ‘power of ideas’, interest group capture and 
bureaucratic organisational process. Together, they provide a fair sample of the diversity of current 
principal frameworks.  
 To compare retrodictions of state unitariness, we examine theories’ expectations about the 
extent of buffering (Thompson 1967; Lynn 2005) of economic regulatory cooperative priorities 
from security ones. By ‘buffering’ (adapting Lynn 2005 38ff for present purposes) we mean effects 
of informal or formal institutions, intendedly or otherwise, which insulate to a significant degree 
the work priorities of an entity (department, office agency, team, etc.) from threats of interference 
or obstruction by another entity. 
 Realist theories are broadly concerned with powerful states’ strategic self-interest in security, 
and ultimately in territorial and military security, driving them to create and to sustain international 
regulatory organisations where they can be made to serve their security aims. This realist argument 
takes various forms including contrasting structural (Waltz 1979; Stone 2011; Krasner 1991) and 
neoclassical variants (Lobell et al. 2009; Ripsman et al. 2016), as well as others. Because this is a 
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policy process study (encompassing foreign and domestic policy departments and agencies), we 
focus on Type III neoclassical realism (Ripsman et al. 2016: Type III seeks to offer the most general 
version of the theory) rather than structural neo-realism, because the latter eschews predictions 
about specific foreign policy decisions but only predicts long-run trends, and claims to explain 
outcomes without any reference to internal processes. Although Narizny (2017) argues that 
neoclassical realism should not be counted as realist at all, it remains the theory of foreign 
policymaking decisionmaking closest to realist assumptions about states’ priorities and capabilities. 
In the neoclassical realist view, the imperial or nation state is a unitary actor because key decisions 
on international cooperation are funnelled through the security-focused decision-making core 
institutions. However, neoclassical realism emphasises the domestic context shaping ways in which 
external threats and policy responses are evaluated under imperfect information both about 
security threats and other states’ beliefs and intentions. States pursue relative gains, combining 
cooperation with conflict in order to pursue asymmetric relative gains. International cooperation 
and commitment to global regulatory bodies are pursued only insofar as they further these ends. 
Buffering of economic from security policy is expected to be limited, conditional, reversible, and 
tolerated only temporarily. 
 Liberal institutionalist theorists, by contrast, argue that states pursue their interests in a wide 
range of fields; where cooperation appears likely to enhance their economic strength, they commit 
to institutions embodying it and enabling them to gain by economic cooperation. This liberal 
institutionalist argument takes various forms including contractual strategies (Keohane 1984) and 
bargaining (Young 1991). Here, we concentrate on Young’s (1989) integrative bargaining theory, 
extending it beyond regime formation to maintenance, because it makes neither the restrictive 
assumptions that the typical structure of games will be a prisoners’ dilemma (unlike Keohane 1984) 
nor assumptions about states’ knowledge of each other’s intentions; nor (unlike Moravcsik 1997) 
does it assume that societal coalitions with well-formed preferences exist prior to and shape state 
policymaking. In liberal institutionalist accounts, states cooperating in regimes, motivated by 
search for absolute gains, are expected to be keener to participate than they would be on realist 
assumptions. They design their strategy for a mix of conflict and cooperation for absolute gains. 
States are expected to be unitary, although Young argues that this depends somewhat on domestic 
leadership. However, pursuit of absolute gains means that buffering of economic from security 
interests can be fairly strong where the payoffs from cooperation are expected to be large. 
 Rather than pursuing interests or objective payoffs, ideational theories argue that states’ 
willingness to cooperate in global bodies is driven by prevailing beliefs, norms or ideas, either 
about their own or other states’ or existing international bodies’ problems, interests or capabilities. 
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There are many ideational theories; here we focus on those which accept a causal role for these 
beliefs (Blyth 2002; Morrison 2015; even despite his rhetoric, Wendt 1999) rather than strongly 
interpretivist accounts which reject causal explanation entirely. Because ideas conflict, states would 
not be expected to be unitary in beliefs, except where persuasion by ideas is complete. Strategy for 
the mix of cooperation and conflict will depend on the particular ideas or norms followed. 
Buffering would be driven by the degree of attachment of contrasting ideas around economic and 
security issues. 
 Regulatory capture theory rejects claims of states’ unitariness and autonomy, arguing instead that 
interests of organisations which are outside the policymaking core but which are of economic or 
strategic importance to states secure control over or capture policymakers in their own private 
interests (Carpenter and Moss 2014; Mattli and Woods 2009). Those may be departments, state-
owned enterprises or private commercial companies. This approach expects states to commit to 
international regulatory bodies when departments or companies which have secured influence over 
them see private advantages for their own purposes in working through the international regime. 
Here, we group regulatory capture theory with a hypothesis that at least some of the capturing 
enterprises (both the state-owned ones and the private, typically international corporations) are 
engaged in international cartel formation, normally for absolute gains in protection against 
predatory competition, and seek capture over international regulatory cooperation to secure and 
sustain their cartel. We also group this with epistemic communities theory (Haas 1992); although 
often associated with liberal institutionalism, this theory actually argues for capture not by 
economic interests but by coalitions of technocratic elites, who are argued to be already engaged 
in transnational communication before contributing to their takeover of intergovernmental 
regulatory bodies. Buffering is expected to be strong around zones captured by special interests, 
and defended on normative grounds by technocratic epistemic communities, but not necessarily 
otherwise. (Here we exclude the literature on international technical standard setting bodies, 
because in our period the ITU set hardly any standards, being preoccupied with tariffs instead.) 
 Another approach not treating the state as unitary is bureaucratic politics theory (Allison with 
Zelikow 1999 [1971]; Halperin et al. 2006), positing instead that departments of state and domestic 
public agencies will pursue their own private departmental interests, which might include the ability 
to use a commitment to an international body within their own government to make the case for 
more resources, more legal powers, or greater pre-eminence in or even control of inter-
departmental policymaking processes, or opportunities for their own senior staff to secure status 
or fast-track promotion. Strategy for a mix of cooperation and conflict will depend on the relative 
power of security-focused and economically-oriented departments. Buffering of economic 
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departments’ priorities for international regulatory cooperation against intrusion by other 
departments of state, including those of foreign and security policymaking will be will be strong, 
especially where key departmental or agency interests are at stake.  
 These five theories represent much of mainstream IR and political science wisdom on the 
question of states’ resilient commitment to international regulatory bodies. An important way to 
compare the explanatory power of theories is to examine the trade-offs that their explanations of 
a case achieve among different methodological virtues. Przeworski and Teune (1970) established 
the key principle in social science methodology, that it is impossible simultaneously in the same 
explanation to optimise  
- parsimony (explaining the greatest number of aspects of a case or cases with the fewest 
possible explanatory factors, mechanisms, etc.); 
- generality (application to as wide as possible a range of aspects of cases, sub-cases such as 
sub-periods, or cases); 
- goodness of fit (sometimes called accuracy or descriptive adequacy, meaning accurate 
prediction of the greatest level of empirical detail in cases); and  
- causality (clear specification of causal mechanisms, causally significant constraining or 
amplifying contextual facts). 
This has been developed and extended subsequently to include, for example, 
fundamentality in causation (meaning capturing significant distal causes, rather than 
proximate or immediate causation) (6 and Bellamy 2012, 289).  
 At face value, the theories outlined above seem to strike different trade-offs between these 
virtues. For example, although Waltz’s structural neorealism was prepared to sacrifice much 
goodness of fit to maximise parsimony and generality, we might expect from its core assumptions 
that Type III neoclassical realism would sacrifice parsimony for goodness of fit: in fact, its variables 
are many. Thus, after having considered the explanations of the case against the archival data, we 
assess the trade-offs actually achieved (as opposed to those predicted by the core assumptions) by 
each theory, after the empirical limitations of their explanations have been considered. 
 
Case selection 
Comparing theories’ explanatory power for decisions taken under contextually different 
circumstances and conditions requires longitudinal analysis to examine change over time. To 
understand these dynamics over a sufficiently long period of deepening conflict to address the 
puzzle, therefore we must examine an historical case spanning several decades in detail. 
International relations scholarship has increasingly demonstrated the importance of studying 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century cases to refine and examine relevant theories (e.g., Buzan 
and Lawson 2015; Walter 2016). 
 Any good theory to explain a puzzle of this kind should be able to explain a ‘crucial’ case, 
meaning a “discomfirmatory most-likely” one for the puzzle (Gerring, 2007, 120-22) – in this case, 
where the outcome of commitment breaking down is a markedly more likely one than for other 
states. Examining a ‘crucial’ case can provide a justification for choosing that case on the 
dependent variable – namely, a case in which commitment was in fact sustained resiliently – at 
least for modest purposes of within-case theory-exploration, which this article’s aim (6 and 
Bellamy, 2012; Rueschemeyer, 2003). Thus, we use the concept of a ‘crucial case’ in relation to its 
particular outcome (resilient commitment) which is challenging to explain, rather than in relation 
to the predictions of one particular theory. For the purpose of this study we define a case a central 
or crucial one for this puzzle, where 
(a) it presents the puzzle in especially severe form, because the security tensions are very great 
but the commitment to cooperation is actually increasing, thus making it a particularly 
important case for any theory to explain; 
(b) where the state in question, although not actually a hegemon, is at least one of the great 
powers with an economy of sufficient global reach that unilateralism was at least a credible 
option, thus making it highly relevant to explain sustained commitment to membership; and  
(c) the regime in question arose sufficiently early in the development of international regimes 
that cooperation cannot be regarded as so institutionalised that withdrawal would have become 
unthinkable or that such powerful transnational non-state groupings might have grown up 
around it that they could realistically impose major costs on a withdrawing state, thus making 
the case a defining one for the field. 
 To make analysis manageable, we focus on a single case. A case which meets these criteria is 
that of Britain’s surprisingly resilient commitment to membership of the international regime for 
telegraphy between the late 1860s and 1914. Telegraphy was a revolutionary innovation of the 
nineteenth century which transformed communications in business, diplomacy, military operations 
and which both followed and amplified patterns of world trade and diplomatic connection but 
also helped to open up new global connections (e.g., Wenzlhuemer 2013). A key component of its 
international regime was the International Telegraph Union (ITU), the first global multilateral 
regulatory body (founded in 1865 at an international conference in Paris) and the first public 
international organisation to have its own bureau (created by treaty in 1868) with a civil servant 
rather than a politician as its director-general, the first to separate its constitution in treaty form 
from its regulations which could be amended at frequent opportunities and to locate its base in a 
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neutral state (Balbi et al., 2014; Codding, 1952; Fari et al., 2015; Headrick, 1991; Krasner, 1991; 
Laborie, 2013; Lyall, 2011; Reinalda, 2009). Britain joined somewhat belatedly in 1871 well after 
the founding bargaining. From the late 1970s, the ITU held a series of so-called ‘technical’ (in fact, 
highly political) conferences on regulation at which states’ telegraph administrations argued over 
tariffs, regulations and ultimately over power and influence, yet with increasing regulatory 
ambition. The ITU continues to this day in the International Telecommunication Union, an agency 
of the United Nations. The regime’s other main component was the Submarine Cable Convention 
of 1884, at a period of heightened imperial tensions, signed in Paris after two global conferences 
and adhered to by 1914 by many nations which remained outside the ITU (Hills, 2002; Hugill, 
1999; Kennedy, 1971). Together, they formed a joint regime governing vast global 
telecommunications networks and indirectly regulated the huge multinational cable companies 
which adhered to it. 
 Britain’s commitment to the regime meets the criteria because the global scale of imperial 
connections by cable made it feasible, had Britain been determined to do so, for it to withdraw 
from the ITU to run a separate imperial system, just as the US operated outside the ITU in this 
period, and because its relations with rival empires exposed it to intense conflict with other states 
in ITU membership. Even as telegraphy increasingly became bound to Britain’s geostrategies and 
as free trade stalled, Britain’s regulatory cooperation with other states continued through the ITU, 
including closer bilateral technical cooperation with Germany in the decade before the Great War.  
 Although their intercontinental cable connections still ran through Britain until the 1890s, to 
varying degrees, France and Germany operated at the same scale, had options, faced tensions with 
other empires, and struggled with many of the same dilemmas about how far and how 
simultaneously to pursue deepening cooperation with other states in the regime even as tensions 
mounted first over imperial strategy in Asia and Africa and then in the European theatre as alliance 
blocs manoeuvred though the series of crises leading to the Great War. Therefore analysis of the 
British case can illuminate features common to other member states, and may provide a basis for 
future comparative research on other European states’ relations with international regulatory 
bodies in this period. 
 Those tensions were both general and serious for Britain. Contrary to older notions of the 
nineteenth century as a ‘long peace’, the period from the Crimean war (1854-6) to the catastrophe 
of August 1914 was marked by deepening international conflict affecting Britain (Osterhammel 
2014; Buzan and Lawson, 2015) including in international policy fields often thought of as civilian 
matters (Walter, 2016). Britain was anxious about the 1870-1 Franco-Prussian war and feared being 
dragged into European war if the 1875 “war in sight” crisis had led to a German attack on France 
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violating Belgium. Yet 1871 was the very year in which Britain joined the ITU, and 1875 was the 
year of the final ITU diplomatic conference at which Britain played a significant role. Imperial 
tensions with France over Africa culminated in the 1898 Fashoda stand-off, and each subsequent 
crisis from the second Boer War to the Great War stoked tensions between Britain and Germany, 
yet these were the years of Britain’s deepest cooperation with France and Germany in telegraphy. 
 The two European unions which preceded the ITU worked successfully from the early 1850s, 
and then the ITU itself operated for six years before Britain agreed to join (Fari et al., 2015). By 
the 1900s, if Britain had withdrawn to create a separate imperial system, the ITU would not have 
collapsed. Yet its ability indirectly to influence the private submarine cable companies managing 
much of the global network many of which were headquartered or financed in Britain and which 
made Britain for decades the main hub in the global cable network (Wenzlhuemer, 2013) would 
have been greatly reduced. Its scope would have been largely limited to the landline network. The 
smaller submarine networks of the Danish, French and German companies (unless a British 
withdrawal and separate imperial system had encouraged those countries also to withdraw). The 
result would have been a balkanised ‘splinternet’ system, rather than a global regulatory framework. 
The choice of Britain’s commitment for this study is therefore of analogous relevance to 
contemporary challenges, now that rival great powers are imposing their own data standards and 
controls on communications in their own spheres of influence, and now that great powers are 
threatening withdrawal from a number of longstanding global regulatory regimes. 
 Thus, the case is a crucial one for theories of state commitment to explain in the sense, not 
that Britain was crucial to the regime’s survival, but that methodologically any good theory should 
be able to explain well the deepening commitment of a major power to cooperation with other states 
at a time when tensions were also deepening, when it had feasible alternatives and contemplated 
withdrawal, to a regime created sufficiently early in the development of global governance that 
there was not yet generalised institutionalisation default position or a norm of continued 
commitment (unlike for European countries after the formation of the League of Nations or more 
widely in the post 1946 period: Hooghe et al., 2020).  
 Having argued that Britain’s commitment to the ITU and SCC is a crucial case, we explain our 
‘within case’ focus. We have selected a set of clusters of decisions for examination, on the basis 
that an analysis of British governments’ approaches to these decisions, when taken together, can 
suffice to examine the reasons that the British state remained committed to resilient maintenance 
and deepening of the international regime for telegraphy even when there were opportunities to 
act in ways that might have undermined it. We consider first the decision in 1871 to ‘adhere’ to 
the ITU, when previously British governments had declined invitations for involvement in 
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previous initiatives (e.g., as early as 1851), and the decision to remain a member when serious 
arguments were made in 1901 for possible withdrawal. Next we consider the long term goals which 
successive British governments pursued within the ITU, even when these goals clashed at least in 
the short term with demands made by other member states, which might have led to crises. Third, 
we consider the British approach to the ‘other half’ of the international regime for telegraphy – 
namely, the negotiation of the Submarine Cable Convention of 1884, when Britain committed to 
adherence but with a declaration which has often been regarded by historians as a significant 
‘reservation’. Finally, we turn to the decisions in which tension could readily have arisen between 
national and imperial security goals including on the one hand, preparations for telegraphy in time 
of war and the arguments for ‘all-red’ lines, enemy cable ‘grappling’ and cutting, defence of landing 
sites and, on the other, commitment to the international regime, reviewing the deliberations in the 
Balfour of Burleigh committee in 1901-2 about possible withdrawal. 
 In each subcase, we consider the power of the five theories both descriptively and explanatorily 
in understanding British government approaches. For it is a reasonable expectation that theories 
which are offered to explain the general puzzle about why states would sustain international 
regulatory cooperation during deepening conflict should be able satisfactorily to explain decisions 
to join and remain in membership, withstand opposition within a regime without seeking to break 
it up, commit to all key parts of a regime and strike some workable settlement between regime 
membership and institutionalisation on the one hand and security goals on the other. If the main 
theories from across the social sciences struggle to meet this standard of within-case analysis on a 
crucial case, then this strongly suggests that there is space for a fresh approach to be considered. 
 
Method and data 
The qualitative case study design of this study focuses on a comparison among three sub-periods: 
1. 1860s-the end of the 1870s: The ITU was created, its bureau was established during a 
founding series of conferences and conventions (1865, 1868, 1871 and 1875).  
2. c.1879-c.1898: The Submarine Cable Convention was signed in 1884. ITU cooperation 
deepened through the coordinating work of the bureau with member states’ telegraph 
administrations (Balbi et al., 2014) and through the series of ‘technical’ conferences which 
developed, amended and updated the extensive system of regulations beyond the basic set 
agreed in 1875.  
3. c.1898-1914: In the late 1890s through to 1904, the ITU bureau made heroic efforts to 
develop detailed regulation of codes and also extended its scope into telephony, although 
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it failed to persuade states to give it authority over the then new technology of 
radiotelegraphy.  
 
 To understand states’ willingness to sustain cooperation in international regulatory bodies it is 
necessary to examine data from national archives, and not only to consider international bodies’ 
own archival material. 
 To explore the issue of the degree of internal state unity, we have photographed and annotated 
in detail, using codes derived from these theories, key files from the UK National Archives in Kew 
and the British Telecom Archives in Holborn from all three sub-periods from the following 
departments: Cabinet series (CAB and occasionally PRO); Treasury (T); Home Office (HO); 
Foreign Office (FO); War Office (WO); Colonial Office (CO); Admiralty (ADM); General Post 
Office (POST); Board of Trade (BT); and in addition we have consulted some files from Transport 
(MT) and Railways (RAIL) series. This amounts to 160 files in all, some of which are very short 
but some of which run to thousands of pages in length. 
 
Exploring five social science theories in the case of British decision-making on 
telegraphy policy, the ITU and SCC: analysis 
The analysis of key decisions suggests that each of the theories has some prima facie descriptive 
adequacy or at least partial goodness of fit for at least some sub-periods, but also that each fails 
satisfactorily to capture key aspects of the case in its explanation.  
 The neoclassical realist approach appears to yield a broadly correct prediction for the third sub-
period from c.1898-1914 in respect of the importance of military planning for cable-cutting in time 
of war, and to a lesser extent security arguments for ‘all-red lines’ in imperial strategy, and of 
coordination of policy across departments, in which the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID, 
from 1902 onward although building on some previous less successful initiatives in coordination: 
Mackintosh 1962; Johnson 1961) played an important part both formally and informally (CAB 
16/14, Report of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Submarine Cable Communications in 
Times of War). The minutes of the committee show an ever increasing willingness to cut cables in 
times of war, while cable cutting was regarded as unlikely and arguments were put forward largely 
against cable cutting in 1902 (p. 206-p.207), it was considered a geostrategic necessity and certainty 
by 1911 (p. 211). 
 In the second sub-period, for the inclusion of the declaration in the 1884 Submarine Cable 
Convention, it performs much less well than might first appear. In the conference negotiations 
not one state objected to the principle that the convention applied only in peacetime; debate was 
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mainly about the peculiar, rather legalistic design of the British – almost certainly British FO 
Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Julian Pauncefote’s (a lawyer with no Admiralty or War Office 
experience: Neilson and Otte, 209, 62-67) – draft clause, written and presented at a very late stage 
(Pauncefote, PUS FO, to Government Law Officers, 24.1.1883, PRO 30/29/359), which had 
attracted little enthusiasm even in the Foreign Office (Kennedy, FO delegate to the conference 
and the influential head of the FO’s Commercial Department, memo, 8.12.1883, PRO 30/29/359) 
and none elsewhere (Bateman Champain, Director of the Indian Telegraph Service, memo 
15.11.1883, PRO 30/29/359 provided a pointed critique); even in the Admiralty and War Office 
who were informed at a late stage and merely noted that the draft clause would meet the Foreign 
Office (rather than their) objectives, and neither military department had been consulted on it nor 
thought it necessary, let alone strategically important (Tryon, Admiralty, to Fitzmaurice, FO, 
14.1.1884, PRO 30/29/359). In inter-departmental exchanges in preparation and at the 
conference, much more contentious were issues about court jurisdictions, fishing interests, signals 
for cable repairing ships, etc. The clause was not agreed by other states and when Britain’s fallback 
of an accepting anodyne Austrian clause got nowhere, the British ‘declaration’ was entered as a last 
minute face-saving operation (Granville, Foreign Secretary to Lyons, ambassador in Paris, 
11.1.1884, PRO 30/29/359). The principle was not regarded as a major issue either by other 
departments or other states: other states thought the declaration simply unnecessary because it 
only stated the obvious: it was therefore hardly a ‘reservation’. Moreover, in 1882-4, the wartime 
‘declaration’ was not yet part of any coherent strategy for wartime cable-cutting in Britain or any 
other state (save perhaps Germany: memo by Kennedy, FO, 8.1.1884; nonetheless Germany had 
then then no worked-out geostrategic plan for it). There would be no be coherent British plan for 
wartime cable-cutting or for landing site defence for at least another fifteen years (CAB 18/16, 
1898 interdepartmental committee on ‘Control of Communications by Submarine Telegraph in 
Time of War’) and no detailed one for cutting until 1911 (CAB 16/14 subcommittee on Submarine 
Cable Communications in Time of War, 11.12.1911). Indeed, in the early 1880s the Royal Navy 
was quite unprepared for a major power naval war (Friedberg 1988, 146). Therefore, neoclassical 
realism’s explanatory power for Britain’s strategy toward the Submarine Cable Convention is at 
best weak to moderate. 
 Even in the third sub-period, this theory performs poorly in explaining the role of the GPO 
in ITU conferences including their willingness to agree to the plan that the Union should 
encompass telephony regulation, where commitment to the pursuit of absolute gains continued to 
be important, nor does it explain why the Treasury, a key part of the core executive, continued to 
be reluctant, even after Hicks-Beach had left the Treasury for the final time, to subsidise 
 13 
unprofitable all-red lines wherever the Admiralty and the CID called for them (civilian usage of 
international telegraphy often followed prior patterns of trade rather than creating new trade 
routes; yet many lines and cable were installed where there was no general economic 
interdependence, which itself shows the limitations of narrowly economic functionalistic theories 
of international cooperation in this field). Indeed, the GPO telegraph department’s collaboration 
with the German telegraph administration was becoming closer and deeper in the final five years 
before the Great War, even though its leadership was also fully involved in CID planning (POST 
83/72/TCB/282/23 passim). Nor is it clear that when the theory is descriptively adequate, its 
explanation is convincing. Security threats for Britain were not absent in the second sub-period, 
during 1870s or 1880s: the 1875 ‘war in sight’ crisis, had it been as real a threat as many feared, 
could have entangled Britain just as later crises did. Concerns over the security of the route to 
India mattered objectively as much in the 1870s as they did in the 1890s and 1900s, yet they did 
not elicit the same policy response in telegraphy in the two sub-periods. For example, the 
revelation of incompetence and lack of policy coordination in the early 1880s over something as 
simple as the insertion of emergency powers of interception into landing rights concessions (HO 
144/150/A38694. passim but esp. Home Office to Harcourt, 6.3.1885) shows how little security-
driven coordination of telegraphy policy was in place in the first and second sub-periods. Buffering 
of civilian from security considerations in telegraphy was much more significant in all three sub-
periods than the neoclassical ‘funnelling’ account would expect, even in the final years when we 
should most expect security imperatives to dominate. 
 Integrative bargaining theory appears to capture some centrally important features of the first sub-
period from the 1860s to the end of the 1870s. Balbi et al. (2014) show that Switzerland, for 
example, committed to the ITU in pursuit of absolute gains from increased volumes of traffic 
from which it could secure transit charges and was prepared to accept reduced relative gains in 
order to achieve this. Britain entered the ITU under considerable uncertainty about its own likely 
future position, not least because it was far too early to judge the future success of John Pender’s 
(founder and controller of what became the Eastern Group, the technology giant of its era) 
investment of the proceeds of nationalisation of the domestic companies in ambitious international 
submarine cable companies, and although it still seemed likely in 1871 that the momentum in 
continental politics lay with free trade which would increase demand for international telegrams, 
the wars of Italian and German unification and Russian revanchisme over the Black Sea clauses 
engendered considerable uncertainty over future European trade (Marsh 1999, 79-87). 
Nevertheless, Britain’s strategy within the ITU especially in the 1875 St Petersburg conference and 
for the subsequent decade could be said broadly to pursue absolute more often than narrowly 
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relative gains vis-à-vis other member states in its approach to particular proposed treaty and 
regulation changes, although considerations of relative status at least vis-à-vis non-member states 
were probably important in the 1871 decision to adhere (POST 30/228: ‘Report of the Messrs 
Chambre and Fischer’). Britain was prepared at least occasionally to rein in the demands of the 
submarine cable companies to achieve agreement, and played a broadly constructive role in 
facilitating the deepening of cooperation, even hosting ITU conferences and brokering deals, when 
that role could readily have been left to others. The GPO did this work with the full knowledge of 
the Foreign and Home Offices and Treasury, which were kept informed on key developments 
(POST 30/288: ‘St Petersburg Telegraph Convention – Main Papers’ and ‘Approval of St 
Petersburg Convention by Luxembourg and Romania’).Even in this period, the theory gives a poor 
prediction for the late decision to attend the 1871 conference at which the country first adhered 
to the conventions, the ungracious behaviour of its delegates there in demanding opt-outs (the 
term is no anachronism: it was used in the files) and its apparent lack of clear strategy or objectives 
(Robinson, n.d. 1875, ‘Report of the Indian delegates to the St. Petersburg telegraph conference 
1875’, HO257/10, esp. pp.19-20). Integrative bargaining captures something, but not all of British 
strategy toward the 1869 American and then in the mid-1880s the French initiatives for what 
became the Submarine Cable Convention. Britain largely ignored early (1869) American proposals, 
responded initially with caution to the French invitation in 1882. Departments such as the Board 
of Trade were more concerned to limit a Convention’s requirement for changes to domestic law 
and to protect the jurisdiction of other negotiating for a such as the ‘Rules of the Road at Sea’ 
talks, than to bargain with other states (e.g., Farrar, BoT, to Dilke, FO, 19.5.1882, again 12.12.1883 
and Calcraft BoT to Dilke 3.10.1882, PRO 30/29/359). Perhaps integrative bargaining theorists 
might explain this as simply a case of lack of domestic leadership for negotiation. Yet the Board, 
the Post Office and the Foreign Office were all keen to have delegates on the British team, and 
Kennedy provided informal leadership of the negotiating team: more fundamentally, what was 
missing was any great willingness to offer concessions in return for a more ambitious agreement 
than the modest but serviceable one which emerged. Nor does the theory perform at all well in 
understanding the growing coordination of telegraphy policy around imperial, military and security 
objectives in the third sub-period after 1898. In sum, the liberal institutionalist view over-predicts 
the pursuit of absolute gains (see below on the GPO’s deep misgivings about the Pacific cable 
scheme in the late 1890s), fails to account for British belated and reluctant engagement, and 
provides a poor explanation for the GPO’s close involvement in the third sub-period with the 
Committee of Imperial Defence’s plans for cable-cutting in war. Even when it predicts the extent 
of buffering, it does not account well for its motivations. 
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 Ideational theory has limited grip. Because the ITU was the first global regulatory body, even 
after other public administrative unions were created, any norm for cooperation during conflict 
through them was still weak and novel: the fact that the regime had been formed through during 
the wars of German unification hardly create a very firm norm, that could bind, for example, 
Britain or Russia, and certainly did not bind the US which did not join in this period. True, 
Gladstone was in office when Britain adhered in 1871 and he had a longstanding sentimental 
hankering for ‘concert of Europe’ approaches to diplomatic institutional design. Yet, preoccupied 
as he and foreign secretary Granville were at the time with the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian 
war and the ‘Alabama’ case, Gladstone offered no written contribution to the adherence decision: 
it was never brought to Cabinet (Matthew 1982). Moreover, by this time, in the politically more 
central field of tariff reduction negotiations which could have framed his thinking, Gladstone now 
preferred bilateral to multilateral approaches (Marsh 1999, 85) so might have needed coaxing about 
a multilateral telegraphy treaty. Nor is there any evidence that Foreign Secretary Granville did 
much more than note the Belgians’ argument that it would be absurd for them to be left to claim 
to represent at the ITU the British interests at stake in the relationship between the British-owned 
company operating the cable between Britain and Belgium (Beaulieu to Granville, Oct.1870, FO 
83/431), then fairly quickly approved a request and despatched it to the Treasury for final 
authorisation, which was in any case months in coming (Granville to Lords of the Treasury, 
16.11.1870, FO83/431). If ideas mattered, there is no evidence of larger normative justifications 
in the archival data. True, in the third sub-period, ideologies of imperialism could readily be used 
as justifications for both Fleming’s proposals for the Pacific cable (Boyce 2000) and for Lamb’s 
(GPO) opposition to it (Report of the committee appointed to consider the proposal for laying a 
telegraph cable between British North America and the colonies of Australasia, March 1897, Col. 
Office, Misc 108, Minutes of Proceedings, Ninth day, 30.11.1896, esp. p.147, CAB 18/16. See also 
POST 83/61/TCB/285/9 for subsequent policy debates), and for both all-red cables wherever 
the Admiralty diagnosed some security concern and wherever the Treasury was persuaded that 
imperial considerations trumped open-ended financial commitments. Although Fleming argued 
for the Pacific cable by appeal to ideology of imperial economic integration, this was certainly not 
the decisive factor in the British government’s belated and reluctant decision to commit to it 
(Boyce 2000). In each of these cases, imperial ideology is a latecomer to the debates, which had in 
each case begun with arguments of much more mundane kinds about dominion economic 
development or about the commercial viability of particular cables or sometimes Admiralty 
sectional preferences. The Balfour of Burleigh committee’s 1901 consideration of possible 
withdrawal made no reference either to any general norm for membership or to imperialist 
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ideology as arguments for and against. Buffering between civilian and security considerations in 
international telegraphy policy was driven more by institutional than ideational forces. 
 As an argument for regulatory capture, Hills’ (2002, 65) claim that the ITU was intended from 
the first as a cartel of national telegraph administrations has some surface validity, because it 
emerged from  the prior continental unions based on arrangements for pricing, transit and for end-
to-end flows of telegrams in land-based networks. Yet it is not adequate. The cartel itself – set out 
in the non-competition rule which eventually became the much worried-over Regulation 27 was 
not adopted at the founding 1865 conference nor in 1868 but only in 1871, and then it was very 
controversial among the continental members (Fari et al. 2015); only in 1875 after considerable 
discussion and difficulty was the principle of a cartel between the public telegraph administrations 
and private submarine cable companies agreed (Laborie 2013). It was moved from the convention 
to the regulations precisely to enable it to be amended and perhaps even watered down later on. 
Britain was never happy with the cartel rule, but accepted it, as a price to be paid for other, larger 
gains hoped for in the future. Moreover, cartels are not very resilient, as the example of OPEC 
reminds us. Defection is always a temptation. Cartels are fragile. Institutions do not survive and 
grow because they are cartels but rather they do so despite the problems of being a cartel. If the 
ITU was nothing but a cartel, then the steady, managed, reduction in prices is not straightforward to 
understand, because we would then either expect defection from the management of prices (as has 
happened many times in OPEC) or else no reduction in real terms at all. 
 More ink has been spilled over the question of whether the submarine cable companies 
captured states and Britain in particular (Müller-Pohl 2013; Winseck and Pike 2007) or the states 
manipulated the companies, than over any other question in telegraphy policy (Kennedy 1971; 
Hugill 1999; Hills 2002). Certainly, the 1871 decision to allow the companies to attend ITU 
conferences and to lobby but not vote, to adhere to regulations voluntarily in some areas but 
through their states to be subject to Regulation 27 rule against price competition does not support 
the argument for their full capture of the Union. At least in the founding conferences creating the 
conventions and the basic structure of the regulations, Fari et al. (2015) conclude that their 
influence was marginal, even over tariff setting; while that influence grew somewhat, it was never 
complete. Indeed, during ITU conferences cable companies (and some country delegates) regularly 
argued that it was other types of internationally operating businesses which benefitted from tariff 
reduction at the expense of cable companies and member states’ taxpayers. However, there is scant 
evidence that ITU conferences or individual member state administrations were captured by this 
heterogeneous mix of internationally operating companies. 
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 Arguments about capture of the British state over telegraphy policy either by the GPO or the 
submarine cable companies take a different turn for the second and third sub-periods. The GPO 
remained central to telegraphy policy making throughout, and rarely were its delegates absent from 
the main interdepartmental committees which coordinated policy in the third period, nor did the 
FO neglect to seek advice from the GPO, usually drafted by Patey’s staff in the 1880s and Lamb’s 
in the 1890s and 1900s on key decisions. Yet clearly the importance of security considerations in 
the third sub-period showed that on issues of subsidy of ‘strategic’ lines, other departments could 
outweigh the GPO and Lamb’s neo-mercantilist objection to the Pacific cable lost out to Fleming’s 
dominion (Pacific Cable Committee, Report, Minutes of Proceedings, &c., March 1897, CAB 
18/16.). Moreover, the fact that the GPO’s domestic telegraph operation proved consistently loss-
making despite Scudamore’s blithe promises of profits at the time of nationalisation (Perry 1992; 
Fari 2015) weakened their ability to control domestic policymaking, even though the Postmaster-
General was regarded as one of the major offices of state (although not automatically in the 
cabinet) in much of the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 Capture of British state policy making on telegraphy by the submarine cable companies, as 
Müller-Pohl (2013) and Winseck and Pike (2007) have argued, has some prima facie evidence in its 
favour. Pender, and later, Denison-Pender, of the Eastern group, were able ask for and secure 
favours from British diplomats in difficult negotiations with foreign states over landing rights 
concessions following the Treasury decision in principle in 1867 to allow this support to given on 
a case-by-case basis, where wider British interests could be argued to be at stake (Headrick and 
Griset 2001; however all British cable companies sought and sometimes obtained such diplomatic 
support: e.g., Britton and Ahvenainen 2004). In the third sub-period, despite Hicks-Beach’s 
protests in 1901-2, the Treasury’s purse was sometimes but after 1902 fairly rarely prised open to 
subsidise companies’ unprofitable lines around the globe where imperial ‘all-red’ arguments could 
be presented for them, apparently feather-bedding not just Eastern but others too, and often more 
on the basis of Admiralty arguments for lines than company pressure. In the 1871 conference in 
the first period, the GPO appeared sympathetic to the claims by some of the companies that they 
might have voting rights at the ITU (Brown, n.d. 1871, ‘Propositions to be submitted at the ITU 
conference to be held at Rome… and report on the same’, pp.35-36. HO 257/3), although they 
made few efforts ever again to suggest it, after other countries dismissed it. In the second period, 
there is very limited evidence of capture by the submarine cable companies. In preparation for the 
Submarine Cable Convention, both the Board of Trade (Farrar, BoT, to Dilke, FO, 19.5.1882, 
again 12.12.1883 and Calcraft BoT to Dilke 3.10.1882, PRO 30/29/359) and the Post Office 
brusquely rejected Pender’s demands for special privileges for company ships and for sea lanes 
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near cables (Patey GPO to Dilke, 5.10.1882, PRO 30/29/359). Then radical liberal president of 
the Board of Trade, Joseph Chamberlain, adroitly divided the companies, by securing some of 
Eastern’s rivals’ rejection of Pender’s demands (Farrar, BoT to Dilke, FO, 31.3.1882 and again 
Farrar to Dilke, 6.5.1882, PRO 30/29/359). Müller-Pöhl (2013) is able to find occasions when 
GPO efforts under Patey to press for general tariff reductions were rebuffed and tamely 
abandoned; yet Lamb continued to press the companies for reductions on a route-by-route basis 
throughout the 1890s and early 1900s. Nor did business customers of international telegraphy 
show any organised interest in 1871 in actively pressing for British adherence to the ITU: their 
activity was confined to pressing for nationalisation of the domestic sector (Fari, 2015, 199-201 
finds just one newspaper leader article and an article by Chadwick mildly suggesting advantages, 
and no chamber of commerce pressure. 
 If there was capture, it was hardly consistent or complete. Despite particular failures and 
apparently tame withdrawals, there is evidence that on many occasions, the GPO pressed the 
companies to reduce tariffs in its informal side-negotiations with them at ITU conferences, and it 
regularly advised the Foreign and Colonial Offices to make tariff reductions a condition of either 
supporting the companies in talks with other governments for landing rights or granting 
concessions in British colonies. The GPO’s objections to the Pacific cable were not principally on 
the grounds that it would compete with Eastern’s existing provision, but on grounds of British 
national (as opposed to imperial) commercial advantage. Moreover, the GPO’s sensitivity, when it 
was shown, to the companies, usually rested on some recognition that the British state had induced 
them to operate loss-making lines with higher volumes of under-priced government messages than 
profitable private ones for the state’s benefit, which rather suggests reciprocity for a degree of 
government capture of the companies (see e.g., ‘Report of the committee on West Indian cable 
communications’, esp. ‘Statement by Mr Mackay’, May 1904, p.15. CAB17/75). More generally, 
the evidence for capture is stronger, but still not decisive, for the third sub-period than for the first 
two sub-periods. In the context of security-driven imperial telegraphy policy, an opportunity was 
opened to the companies which was much less significant in the earlier periods, and we should 
give more weight to the institutional reordering of state policymaking which made this possible 
and regard the greater degree of company capture as a consequence rather than a cause. Even in 
this sub-period the British government was willing to subordinate company interest to geostrategic 
considerations in ways that were hardly favourable to the companies, as for example seen in the 
decision to make companies responsible for the repairs (including their costs) of cables which were 
cut in time of war (CAB 16/14, Committee of Imperial Defence, Report on Submarine Cable 
Communications in Time of War (December 1911), p. 7). Capture, either by the interests of the 
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nationalised domestic service or by the commercial submarine cable companies, explains neither 
the extent of buffering of civilian from security policy considerations nor its changing trajectory 
over the three sub-periods. 
 Epistemic community theory has the weakest grip on British policymaking around the telegraph. 
The transnational community of telegraph administrators grew up around the ITU and its two 
predecessor European unions, rather than existing fully fledged prior to its creation. Moreover, 
the regular attenders at the conference, even by the time they eventually became a kind of 
community, were career civil servants in postal and telegraphy departments, who reported to 
ministers and coordinated with other offices of state, not independent experts with authority based 
on recognised on disciplinary professional knowledge, and therefore not an epistemic community. 
As far as Britain’s involvement was concerned, the Society of Telegraph Engineers was established 
in 1871 (Müller 2016, 156-7), after the creation of the ITU or Britain’s adherence, and its 
international influence in forming an epistemic community in telegraphy, which became 
considerable, was an achievement of the subsequent decades. Yet hardly ever do we see 
engineering advice being sought or offered on the key issues facing the ITU such as tariffs or code 
language or British telegraphy policy: key technological elements in regulations such as the early 
commitment to the international use of the Morse code were not significantly influenced by 
organised representation of engineers as a profession; moreover, early ITU efforts which might be 
said to have been designed create an epistemic community were sometimes thwarted, as when the 
proposal for an international training college was rejected (Laborie 2013). Indeed, the ITU did not 
host its first conference for telegraph engineers until 1908, and only managed two more before the 
outbreak of the Great War (POST 30/2921B). 
 Bureaucratic politics theory predicts departmental interests, turf wars, role-based conflict in 
interdepartmental coordination and a causally powerful role for these things in shaping 
policymaking. Descriptively, there are indeed some signs of such activity. For example, in his time 
at the Admiralty in the liberal government after 1906, Churchill could fire off memoranda 
demanding apparently that his department’s interest in telegraphy was so crucial that the 
Admiralty’s control of decision-making over the introduction of censorship should be final 
(Churchill to Ottley CID, 15.2.1912, CAB17/92): predictably, such typically importunate 
behaviour attracted no support, and the Committee of Imperial Defence insisted that all 
departments had a legitimate right to be involved (Ottley to Churchill, 1.1.1912, CAB 17/92). 
Although its expertise rested mainly on its operation of the domestic sector and domestic delivery 
of messages from the companies landing sites and routing domestically generated outward-bound 
messages to them, the GPO clung determinedly to its role in representing the British government 
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in global policy at the ITU and in shaping internal debate on global telegraphy policy (as evidenced 
by its major contributions, for example, to the debates in committee inquiries about the Pacific 
and West Indian cable systems: see above), even when one might imagine that the creation of the 
commercial department within the FO (Otte 2013) might have challenged it. Yet capture by the 
GPO certainly cannot explain the decision to adhere in 1871. The GPO was then focused on 
nationalisation of the domestic companies and their management within its structures, was 
reluctant to join at that point, and devoted rather little attention to the ITU until after 1871: its 
contribution to the 1871 Rome conference was modest and rather begrudging. Nor did GPO 
Second Secretary Patey’s contributions to the inter-departmental discussions in preparation for the 
Submarine Cable Convention focus much at all on any desires arising from, let alone special 
privileges for, the GPO’s own domestic telegraph service’s interface with the submarine cable 
companies at landing points (See e.g., Blackwood GPO to Tenterden, PUS (before Pauncefote) 
FO,19.5.1882, PRO 30/29/359). More important, the role-based turf wars and infighting 
predicted by bureaucratic politics theory are marked more by their absence, save perhaps mildly in 
the third sub-period, than by their presence. Not only was no challenge offered by the FO to the 
GPO’s monopoly of representing the government at the ITU, the one department which could 
credibly have claimed to have an expertise and interest in leadership, the Board of Trade, showed 
itself largely somnolent on telegraphy for much of the century, save to protect its ‘Rules of the 
Road at Sea’ forum from encroachment by the conference on the Submarine Cable Convention 
in the early 1880s. The Board mechanically registered company documentation, but its main role 
was the granting of landing rights in the UK, which gave it the most direct connection with what 
could have been the basis for regulation of the submarine cable companies. Yet it exerted itself 
hardly at all. When the Balfour of Burleigh committee proposed in 1902 that the Landing Rights 
Committee become the central coordinating body on telegraphy in Whitehall, there was little of 
the turf battling that this theory would predict (CAB 18/16, Report of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Cable Communications (August 1901); Inter-Departmental Committee on Cable 
Communications, Second Report (March 1902), especially p. 34.). If there was turf war at all, then 
it is to be found in the third sub-period when the Committee of Imperial defence had become 
established, forming both an informal institutional context and a formal court of appeal in which 
to conduct the kind of hand-to-hand administrative combat which this theory would predict. Even 
the Committee of Imperial Defence’s work considering cable cutting in time of war was often 
characterised by productive cooperation between the different departments. As with neoclassical 
realism, integrative bargaining and capture and cartel theory, where we do see bureaucratic politics, 
it is not for the reason that the theory claims. For these reasons, too, bureaucratic politics does not 
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explain either the extent or the limitations of buffering well. For example, it does not explain 
Lamb’s (the GPO’s) national geostrategic rather than departmental view of the Pacific cable or the 
department’s simultaneous enthusiastic commitment in the third period to work with CID on 
cable-cutting while deepening technical cooperation with the German telegraph administration, 
nor does it explain the fact that the war reservation in the Submarine Cable Convention came from 
Foreign Office legalism and not at all from the Admiralty or War Office. 
 
Discussion 
This empirical analysis shows that between the 1860s and 1914, no single security, economic or 
telegraph administrative or company interest rationale or set of ideas explained Britain’s 
commitment to deepening cooperation in the regime while also deepening tension with other key 
member states. Commitment wavered in 1901 but held, while the GPO became ever more 
embroiled both with the ITU and with the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
 In this section, we analyse the findings of the limitations of each theory’s explanation by 
examining the trade-offs among the rival methodological virtues which each has actually achieved. 
Table 1 below summarises the key findings from this section, comparing the theories against each 
of these methodological virtues. 
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Table 1: Comparing theories on methodological virtues 
 
Methodological virtue Parsimony Generality (by sub-periods) Goodness of fit Causality Fundamentality of causality 
Neoclassical realism Strong for about the 
centrality of the: security 
dilemma, boundedly 
rational relative gain 
pursuit, central foreign 
policy institutions 
Weak for intervening 
variables, which make up a 
considerable list (Ripsman 
et al., 2016, 58-79 admit 
that they sacrifice 
parsimony in intervening 
variables for explanatory 
power) 
Strong for Committee of 
Imperial Defence part of 
telegraphy policy in 3rd 
sub-period, but not for 
ITU-facing elements; weak 
for 1st sub-period; weak to 
moderate for 2nd sub-
period, even for SCC ‘war 
reservation’ 
Strong but only for part of 
telegraphy policy in 3rd 
sub-period, otherwise weak 
Moderate: clear 
specification of mechanism 
based on security 
dilemmas, but not well 
integrated with financial 
policy; conventional 
neoclassical realist 
domestic factors such as 
leadership image play no 
major role; strategic culture 
has some grip for 3rd sub-
period 
For this case, weak: 
capacity for security-driven 
telegraphy policy appears 
to depend upon prior 
institutional ordering 
Integrative bargaining Moderate: although pursuit 
of gain under uncertainty is 
fundamental, needs several 
additional factors including 
leadership, not fully 
integrated 
Stronger for 2nd sub-
period, but weak for 
adherence in 1st sub-period 
and for imperial policy in 
3rd 
Weak: in 1st sub-period 
adherence decision, little 
effort in bargaining; when 
put more effort into 
bargaining in 2nd sub-
period ‘technical’ 
conferences, was in 
conditions of greater 
Moderate: clear 
specification of mechanism 
based on boundedly 
rational absolute gain 
pursuit under uncertainty 
but unclear how far the 
additional factors such as 
leadership offset core 
mechanism. However, in 
For this case, weak: 
capacity for bargaining 
depends on prior 
institutional capacity and 
ordering not itself 
explained, and does not 
explain scope restriction to 
exclude radiotelegraphy 
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certainty, contrary to 
prediction 
this case, not at all clear that 
uncertainty played the 
causal role in 1865 
formation or 1871 British 
adherence that the theory 
would predict. 
Ideationalism Strong: prior belief in 
normative ideology 
requires few additional 
factors 
Poor in 1st sub-period – no 
obvious application in 
adherence; some 
application in imperialism 
in 3rd sub-period but late 
contribution of ideological 
arguments suggests a 
reinforcing role 
Poor: connection between 
available ‘concert of 
Europe’, ‘imperialism’ 
ideologies and particular 
decisions hard to discern; 
unclear why other available 
ideologies had no grip (e.g., 
‘tariff reform’ imperialism 
in 3rd sub-period) 
Weak to modest: clearly 
specified mechanism, but 
unclear how prior deep or 
widespread belief has to be 
for the mechanism to work; 
neither free trade nor 
imperialism ideologies 
clearly drive telegraphy 
policy 
Weak for this case: 
ideologies appear to be 
reached for, after options 
are developed and 
commitments already 
entered into, and used with 
considerable flexibility 
Regulatory capture, cartel and 
epistemic community 
Strong: capture mechanism 
by boundedly rational 
pursuit of interests for each 
of these three is 
parsimonious, although 
weakened by need for 
additional factors to 
explain how collective 
action problems are 
overcome 
Weak: cartel rule was not 
adopted initially in ITU; 
doesn’t explain persistence 
into 3rd sub-period; 
Moderate for capture by 
submarine cable 
companies, because at least 
as much evidence of state 
long term manipulation of 
companies as of company 
manipulation of 
Moderate: can’t explain 
adherence, because not 
priority for GPO or 
submarine cable companies 
for key routes; fails 
seriously in explaining 
debates in preparation for 
the SCC in second sub-
period, where one would 
expect to perform well; 
explains participation in 
Weak: unclear what 
thresholds required for 
capture (Carpenter and 
Moss, 2014). Provides little 
explanation for key 
subcases such as treatment 
of Eastern during 
preparation for SCC, or 
public sector option 
selected for Pacific cable. 
Modest for this case: 
impact appears late in 
adherence, late in imperial 
‘all-red’ or cable-cutting 
preparation, and doesn’t 
explain why submarine 
cable companies rather 
than fishing industry 
dominated in SCC 
preparation 
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government; poor for 
epistemic community 
cable-cutting preparation 
debates but not content of 
plan agreed; epistemic 
community theory is 
weakest, because although 
helps to explain fascination 
with code language in 3rd 
period, the community 
develops after the key 
decisions 
Bureaucratic politics Strong: boundedly rational 
pursuit of departmental 
interest under competition 
is parsimonious 
Modest: some evidence of 
infighting in 3rd period, but 
little before then; 
departmental interests 
often ambiguous in 1st and 
2nd periods 
Modest: although makes 
some sense of Admiralty 
strategy, does not explain 
GPO approach to 
adherence or tariff 
reduction, and fails to 
account for Board of Trade 
passivity 
Moderate: mechanism is 
clear although mitigating 
and offsetting factors not 
fully specified. But difficult 
to see the mechanism 
operating powerfully 
enough to explain key 
decisions in any sub-
period. 
Weak for this case: capacity 
for bureaucratic 
competition appears to rest 






As highlighted in the table, none of these theories achieves strong goodness of fit across the whole 
period. In sub-periods in which they achieve some goodness of fit, their capture of causality does 
not show fundamentality: it is not for the explanatory reason that the theory itself offers. While 
each has some degree of parsimony in the number of basic causal mechanisms and factors used, 
that parsimony is deployed at the levels of ascribed motive as self-interest of some defined unit 
(neoclassical realism, integrative bargaining, capture and bureaucratic politics) and justification 
(ideationalism). If each lacks fundamentality, then we might be prepared to accept a different trade-
off between levels of analysis, allowing a little less parsimony and variation at the level of motive 
and justification as they vary between sub-periods, if we can achieve parsimony again at more 
fundamental levels of causation. Thus, none of the five prominent theories entirely satisfactorily 
explains our findings; in particular, although each captures some important factors, none of their 
accounts of how a state’s commitment should be sustained explains the patterns of buffering 
observed. In future articles we shall offer alternative explanations. While scholars who focus on 
exploring complex causality in international relations may not be surprised that none of these 
theories performs well, the findings raise questions for those who are more committed to the 
importance of particular sets of causal forces as emphasised by any of the mainstream theories. 
 
Conclusion 
The study’s obvious limitations qualify our conclusions. We have not examined all variants of 
realist, liberal institutionalist or bureaucratic politics traditions, nor have we ventured empirically 
beyond a single member-country case and period. We offer not a full test but a comparative 
empirical exploration of the explanatory power of these theories against the crucial case of British 
commitment to the regime even as conflict with other member states grew. If sound, however, 
our present finding is significant for the study of international regimes. If these theories cannot 
satisfactorily retrodict and explain the founding and template-setting case of an important state’s 
commitment to an international regulatory regime, this finding casts doubt on their value more 
widely.  
 Our emphasis on buffering as a measure of how simultaneous commitment to deepening 
cooperation and conflict is institutionalised within the executive, and as an operationalisation 
measure for theories, challenges the adequacy of the recent emphasis in regime theory on 
combining theories by recognising functional imperatives on the one hand but offsetting them by 
exogenous ‘politicisation’ which can take the form of hostility to multilateralism, so sacrificing 
some parsimony for better goodness of fit (Zürn, 2018; Hooghe et al., 2020). When, as is not 
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uncommon, states pursue cooperation and conflict simultaneously, an adequate theory of why they 
do so must provide a sound theory of how they do so, in the internal machinery of government as 
an ‘organisation of organisations’, and not only an account of the balance of pressures from wider 
societal politics. From each of those regime theories standardly classified as driven by power, 
interests or knowledge (Hasenclever et al., 1997), hypotheses about institutional capability, or how 
imperatives are buffered, can be derived. By contrast, combining theories by offsetting may capture 
background factors (Hooghe et al., 2020, 105-120) but not the causal process of how commitments 
are buffered. This is not necessarily a strong trade-off between generality and causality. 
 Our argument also suggests that the study of regimes benefits from comparative evaluation of 
theories’ explanatory power using the basic methodological virtues as categories for multi-criteria 
assessment. 
 Understanding the fundamental puzzle of why conflict and international regulatory 
cooperation can run together is as relevant today as it was in the early years of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, at a time when the US has increasingly attacked international organisations 
using arguments that partially echo the 1901 Balfour of Burleigh committee’s threat in its first 
report to propose withdrawal from the ITU, the question seems particularly urgent, about how 
and why great power states’ commitment to international regimes has in the past persisted through 
tensions, shocks, mistrust and even wars. 
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